Richardson v. Richardson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Richardson v. Richardson : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph Lee Nemelka; Joseph Lee Nemelka, P.C.; Attorney for Appellee.
J. Bruce Reading, William G. Wilson; Scalley, Reading, Bates, Hansen and Rasmussen, P.C.;
Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Richardson v. Richardson, No. 20060575 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6632
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, 
Respondent/ Appellant, 
Appellate Case No. 20060575 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Joseph i.ee iNemeiKa ^oo^u) 
Joseph lee Nemelka. P.C. 
Attorney lor Appellee 
6806 South 1300 Hast 
Salt l,akeCily. I 'tali S4:2 • 
Telephone: (80!) 568-0o54 
Facsimile- <8;i' • *M~{)V)(-
J. Bruce Reading (2 ()U» 
William (J. Wilson (S^X7* 
Attorney iur Appellant 
SCALLEY RLADINCi BA'IT.S 
IIANSI-N &. RASMIlSShN. P.C. 
Salt I akeCil>. Utah 8U2I 
15 West South Temple. Suite oUs 
Telephone: (801)568-0654 
Salt Lake Citv.UT 84147-0429 
Facsimile: (80! > 56X-^N'i 
Telephone. (801)531 7H70 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 2 9 2006 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, 
Respondent/Appellee, 
Appellate Case No. 20060575 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Joseph Lee Nemelka (6620) 
Joseph Lee Nemelka, P.C. 
Attorney for Appellee 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 568-0654 
Facsimile: (801) 568-9196 
J. Bruce Reading (2700) 
William G. Wilson (8787) 
Attorney for Appellant 
SCALLEY READING BATES 
HANSEN & RASMUSSEN, P.C. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
15 West South Temple, Suite 600 
Telephone: (801) 568-0654 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0429 
Facsimile: (801) 568-9196 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION I 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 2 
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS, AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND . 4 
Summary 4 
Proceedings and Factual Background 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 8 
ARGUMENT 10 
I. The Court Abused Its Discretion By Requiring Mr. Richardson to Pay 
Increased Alimony as a Substitute for Non-Mandatory Child Support for 
Adult Children 10 
II. Under Utah Law. Automatic Changes in Alimony, Such As the Automatic 
Increases Ordered in This Case, Are Disfavored Unless Supported By 
Evidence 14 
III. The Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Retroactive Alimony Because 
Mrs. Richardson Had Never Requested Interim or Retroactive Alimony 
Until the Conclusion of Trial 17 
CONCLUSION 19 
ADDENDUM 
A. Decree of Divorce (May 19, 2006) 
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (May 19, 2006) 
C Osen v. Osen, (Unreported Memorandum Decision) 
April 6, 2000, WL 33249404 (Utah Ct. App.) 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981) 10 
Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734 at 738 (Utah 2002) 18 
Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1984) 13 
Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999) 1 
Haumontv. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 10 
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 1, 10, 12, 14,15 
Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 1 
Maclean v. MacLean, 523 P.2d 862, at 863 (Utah 1974) 14 
Medley v. Medley, 93 P.3d 847 at 848, n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) 10 
Montoya v. Montoya, 696 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1985) 1 
Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App.1990) 10 
Nelson v. Nelson, 97 P.3d 722, 723-24 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) 15, 16 
Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988) 10 
Osen v. Osen, (Unreported Memorandum Decision), April 6, 2000, WL 33249404 
(Utah Ct. App.) 18 
Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 at 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 14 
Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 189 at 191 (Utah 1975) 14 
ii 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 5,18 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(3) (1998) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3, Subsections (1),(3) and (4) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(4) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8), Subsections (a), (c) and (g) (i)- (ii) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c) 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(ii) 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-4-3 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 through 78-45-13 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(6)(a) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(6) and (7) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 3,11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4 3,11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15 3 
in 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) confers original jurisdiction over this appeal, which 
is an appeal from an order entered in a domestic relations case. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
First Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by mandating incremental 
increases in Mr. Richardson's alimony obligations, to be implemented as each of the 
parties' minor children attain the age of eighteen, when such increases were mandated 
primarily to enable Ms. Richardson to pay speculative and discretionary expenses related 
to adult children? 
Second Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding retroactive 
alimony, even though Ms. Richardson never requested interim alimony or retroactive 
alimony until trial? 
Standards of Review (for both issues): Alimony determinations are reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999); Kelley v. Kelley. 9 
P.3d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). "Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining 
alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 
1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In exercising its discretion, however, the trial court 
must make explicit findings of fact in support of its legal conclusions. Montoya v. 
Montoya, 696 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1985). 
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PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
The first issue, regarding prospective changes in alimony, was preserved during 
trial (see R. 304 (trial transcript at 178-79 and 193) and in a post-trial motion and 
memoranda in support of a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's memorandum 
decision (see R. at 61; 64-65 and 83-85). 
The second issue, regarding retroactive alimony, was preserved in a post-trial 
motion and memoranda in support of a motion for reconsideration (see R. at 61; 65; 67; 
84-85). 
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8), SUBSECTIONS (a), (c) and (g) (i)- (ii): 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor 
spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
* * * * 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in 
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. 
* * * * 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new 
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orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to 
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, 
unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
[Emphasis added] 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-2(6) AND (7): 
(6) "Child" means: 
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise emancipated, 
self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States; 
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high school during the 
normal and expected year of graduation and not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, 
married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States; or 
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and, if able 
to provide some financial resources to the family, is not able to support self by own 
means. 
(7) "Child support" means a base child support award as defined in Section 78-45-2, 
or a monthly financial award for uninsured medical expenses, ordered by a tribunal for 
the support of a child, including current periodic payments, all arrearages which accrue 
under an order for current periodic payments, and sum certain judgments awarded for 
arrearages, medical expenses, and child care costs. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-3: 
(1) Every father shall support his child and every child shall be presumed to be in 
need of the support of his father. Every man shall support his wife when she is in need. 
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of 
both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described in 
Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4: 
(1) Every woman shall support her child and every child shall be presumed to be in 
need of the support of his mother. Every woman shall support her husband when he is in 
need. 
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and necessary 
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medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of 
both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described in 
Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3, SUBSECTIONS (1U3) AND (4): 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish 
an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a 
domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness 
fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to 
prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide 
money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of 
the other party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may 
be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS, AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Summary On or about August 26, 2003, Kynda Kay Richardson petitioned for a 
divorce from her husband, Kenneth Andrew Richardson, in the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County. Among other things, Ms. Richardson requested alimony and 
child support. Ms. Richardson did not request interim alimony in her Petition, and no such 
request was made until the day of trial. 
Ms. Richardson's custody of the parties' four minor children (Dana, Kyle, Avery, 
and Justin) was not contested, and the trial court awarded Ms. Richardson physical 
custody. The trial court awarded $1,374 per month in child support to Ms. Richardson, 
with Mr. Richardson's obligations terminating with respect to each child, either upon the 
child's eighteenth birthday or graduation from high school. The trial court ordered that 
Ms. Richardson was entitled to alimony of $420 per month. The trial court further ordered 
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that prospective increases in Mr. Richardson's alimony payments, in increments of $100 
per month, should be implemented each time one of the four minor children reaches the 
age of eighteen. The trial court determined that Ms. Richardson was entitled to retroactive 
alimony, back to the time of the separation of the parties, even though Ms. Richardson had 
never moved for interim alimony before trial. After a motion for reconsideration, the trial 
court amended its ruling to make alimony retroactive, back to May of 2004 only. 
Proceedings and Factual Background Ms. Richardson filed her Petition for 
Divorce on August 26, 2003. See R. at 1. Mrs. Richardson did not move for temporary 
alimony under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 during the pendency of the action. A trial was 
held on February 8, 2005. After hearing testimony and argument, the trial court took the 
issues under advisement. See R. at 304 (trial transcript at 193). 
During trial, Ms. Richardson testified that the parties' two oldest children had lived 
at home and attended college after reaching the age of eighteen, during which time the 
parties had supported them. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33). On this basis, Ms. 
Richardson requested that the parties be required to treat the four minor children still 
domiciled with her the same way. See id. (transcript at 33). Ms. Richardson admitted, 
however, that there was no verbal or written agreement with Mr. Richardson that the other 
children would be treated the same way. See id. (transcript at 67- 68 (beginning lines 23-
25 of page 68; ending line 15 of page 68)). 
Also during trial, Ms. Richardson made her first requests for retroactive alimony, 
including the period during which the action was pending. See R. at 304 (transcript at 39; 
158; and 165). 
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The trial court issued a Memorandum Decision on June 3, 2005. In its 
Memorandum Decision, the trial court determined that Mr. Richardson should pay $420 
per month in alimony, for a term equal to the length of the marriage. See R. at 57. The 
trial court further determined that 6\ . . a good part of the income needed by Petitioner to 
maintain the appropriate standard of living is also attributable to child support payments 
from Respondent. * * * * . _ because the reasonable expenses associated for a time even 
with older children will not necessarily diminish to zero as they reach 18 years old and 
because some expenses . . . will not necessarily be significantly or proportionately reduced 
the court concludes that it is reasonable to increase alimony to some extent as 
Kynda's income from child support payments goes down and as Kenneth's expenses from 
such payments also diminish." See R. at 57. The trial court therefore determined that, as 
each of the parties' children reaches the age of eighteen, the Mr. Richardson's alimony 
payments should increase by $100 per month. See id. The trial court also determined that 
alimony should be paid retroactively back to the date of the parties' separation. See id. at 
58. 
On July 7, 2005, Mr. Richardson filed his Motion for Reconsideration with the trial 
court. See R. at 61. After full briefing by both sides, the trial court granted the Motion for 
Reconsideration in part, and denied it in part. See R. 103-117. The trial court did not alter 
its decision with respect to prospective alimony increases, and reasoned that the increases 
were not based on speculation, but rather, on circumstances foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. See R. at 106-107 and 207. 
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With respect to retroactive alimony, the trial court reconsidered and foreshortened 
the retroactive award period. In support of its power to make the retroactive award, the 
trial court opined that no statutory language prohibited retroactive awards, and that it had 
broad equitable powers to award retroactive alimony. See R. at 109-110. As further 
support of the award of retroactive alimony, the trial court asserted, incorrectly, that 
retroactive alimony had been requested in the Petition. See R. at 110 (referencing Petition 
at If 21); but see R. at 6, j^ 21, which does not contain a request for retroactive alimony. 
In Mr. Richardson's favor, the trial court noted that Mr. Richardson had made 
generous, voluntary payments to Ms. Richardson before the filing of the Petition, in 
amounts as high as $600 per week. See R. at 110. After Ms. Richardson filed her Petition 
in September of 2003, however, Mr. Richardson began paying approximately $1,350 per 
month (estimated child support only). See id. Starting in May of 2004, Ms. Richardson's 
expenses increased because she moved out of her apartment and began making mortgage 
payments. See R. at 110. Taking all these factors into consideration, the trial court 
amended its ruling, so that retroactive alimony would not be calculated from the time of 
separation, but instead, beginning in May of 2004. See id. at 111. 
The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its Decree 
in this matter on May 19, 2006. See R. 213 and 234. The trial court awarded $1,374 per 
month in child support to Mrs. Richardson, with Mr. Richardson's child support 
obligations scheduled to terminate with respect to each child upon the child's eighteenth 
birthday or upon graduation from high school, if later. See R. at 235. The trial court 
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ordered Mr. Richardson to pay alimony to Ms. Richardson in the amount of $420 per 
month, with increases of $100 per month each time one of the four minor children reaches 
the age of 18. See R. at 228-29 and 239 (explaining, at 228-229 that "reasonable expenses 
associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily diminish to zero as they 
reach eighteen . . . ."). The trial court further ordered that alimony should be retroactive to 
May of 2004. See R. at 229 and 240. 
At the time of the Decree, the ages of the parties' minor children were as follows: 
Dana, 19; Kyle, 17; Avery, 15; and Justin, 12. See R. at 234-35. The eighteenth birthdays 
of the parties' minor children are as follows: May 17, 2005 (Dana); July 19, 2006 (Kyle); 
August 21, 2008 (Avery); and March 25, 2011 (Justin). See R. at 214 (providing birth 
dates). Dana presumably graduated from high school on or about June 4, 2005. See R. at 
304 (transcript at 7). No testimony was presented with regard to Dana's, Kyle's, Avery's 
or Justin's intentions to attend college, to remain at home, or to support themselves after 
their eighteenth birthdays or after high school graduation. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
FIRST ISSUE: The trial court abused its discretion by mandating incremental 
increases in Mr. Richardson's alimony obligations, to be implemented as each of the 
parties' minor children attain the age of eighteen. The increases were mandated primarily 
to enable Mrs. Richardson to pay speculative and discretionary expenses related to adult 
children. 
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The alimony increases are an abuse of discretion for four reasons. First, the 
Richardsons have no legal obligation to support able-bodied children who have reached 
the age of eighteen. Second, there was no persuasive evidence that the parties had ever 
agreed that they would continue to support the four minor children even after they each 
reached the age of eighteen. Third, no evidence was presented regarding the minor 
children's intentions to attend college or remain home after reaching the age of eighteen. 
Ms. Richardson's request was based only upon the parties' history of supporting two other, 
older children who had attended college while living at home. Finally, the increases were 
not based upon factual findings regarding Ms. Richardson's expenses at the time of trial, 
but were instead based upon speculation about her future expenses. 
Even assuming, arguendo, the parties had an agreement about supporting adult 
children who stay at home while attending college, the award is based purely on 
speculation. The record contains no evidence of minor children's intentions in this regard. 
SECOND ISSUE: The trial court abused its discretion by awarding retroactive 
alimony because Ms. Richardson never requested interim alimony until trial. Accordingly, 
Ms. Richardson waived her right to request interim alimony. A statutory mechanism is 
provided to enable parties to request interim alimony before a final judgment is entered. 
Because Ms. Richardson did not avail herself of that mechanism, she was precluded from 
requesting interim alimony at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
L The Court Abused Its Discretion By Requiring Mr. Richardson to Pay 
Increased Alimony as a Substitute for Non-Mandatory Child Support 
for Adult Children 
The purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife. See Medley v. Medley, 
93 P.3d 847 at 848, n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (relying on Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 
P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981). An alimony award should enable the receiving spouse to 
maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Munns 
v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah CtApp.1990). In determining alimony, a trial court 
must consider three factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse, 
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for him- or herself, and 
(3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 
1369, 1372 (Utah 1988); Haumontv. Haumont, 793 P.2d421, 423 (Utah Ct.App.1990); 
Munns, 790 P.2d at 121. 
Any future changes in alimony are limited to instances where a material change of 
circumstances has occurred. See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(emphasis added). Howell also mandates that the "the standard of living existing at or 
near the time of trial" is the appropriate benchmark for determining an alimony award. 
See id. at 1212. 
In the case at bar, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding automatic, future 
increases in its alimony award in order to enable Ms. Richardson to pay speculative 
expenses related to the parties' adult children. See R. at 228-229 (explaining that 
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"reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily 
diminish to zero as they reach eighteen . . . ."). 
First, the automatic increases are not consonant with the goals of alimony. The trial 
court did not order automatic increases only to support Mrs. Richardson. Instead, such 
increases were awarded, at least in part, for expenses related to the parties' adult children. 
The automatic alimony increases are, in effect, disguised and non-mandatory child support 
payments. 
As a matter of law, the Richardsons have no obligation to provide support to able-
bodied, adult children. Under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act (hereinafter, 
"Support Act"), parents are not ordinarily obligated to provide any support to children over 
the age of eighteen. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 through 78-45-13. 
The Support Act does require parents to support their minor children. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3 (father required to support child); 78-45-4 (mother required to 
support child). The Support Act defines a "child," however, as a son or daughter who is 
under the age of eighteen, unless the child is emancipated, married, or serving in the 
armed forces. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(6)(a). The Support Act makes exceptions 
for children who are over the age of eighteen, but still in high school during the normal, 
expected year of graduation. The Act also includes exceptions for disabled children and 
children who are otherwise unable to support themselves. See id. at subsection (b). 
At the time of the decree in this case (May 19, 2006), only one of the parties' 
children (Dana) had attained the age of eighteen. Dana was scheduled to graduate from 
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high school on or about June 4, 2006. See R. at 304 (transcript at 7, line 23). No findings 
were made, however, regarding Dana's ability to support herself after graduation. 
Furthermore, no findings were made regarding the remaining three children's ability to 
support themselves in the future, and any such findings would have been purely 
speculative. As such, the trial court abused its discretion in mandating a $100 increases in 
alimony when each child attains the age of eighteen. 
Ms. Richardson's justification for requesting alimony to compensate her for 
expenses related to adult children was that the parties' two oldest children, Olivia and Ed, 
had lived at home while attending college after they reached the age of eighteen, during 
which time the parties supported Olivia and Ed. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33). Ms. 
Richardson admitted, however, that there was no verbal or written agreement with Mr. 
Richardson that the four younger children would be treated the same way. See id. 
(transcript at 67- 68 (beginning lines 23-25 of page 68; ending line 15 of page 68)). No 
testimony was presented regarding which of the four younger children had been accepted 
to college, intended to go to college, or intended to remain home after reaching age 
eighteen. 
As stated above, the payee spouse's standard of living existing at or near the time of 
trial is the appropriate benchmark for determining an alimony award. See Howell v. 
Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Nevertheless, the trial court awarded 
automatic increases in the alimony award each time one of the parties' children attains the 
age of eighteen. This was an abuse of discretion not only because the future ability of 
each child to support itself is currently unknown, but also because the parties have no legal 
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obligation (either by statute or by agreement) to support such children. Because child 
support is not legally mandated for children over the age of eighteen (unless specific, 
narrow exceptions are met), the parties in this case should be free to decide, either 
individually or together, whether they wish to support their adult children. 
The trial court should not have required Mr. Richardson to provide such non-
mandatory child support in the absence of a contractual or other obligation to do so. As 
the court observed in Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1984), married parents may 
continue to support college-age children who remain at home, but such support umay be 
conditional and may be withdrawn at any time, and no one may bring an action to enforce 
continued payments. It would be fundamentally unfair for courts to enforce these moral 
obligations of support only against divorced parents while other parents may do as they 
choose." See Grapin, 450 So. 2d at 854. 
Moreover, the automatic alimony increases awarded in this case are for an 
indefinite period of time. While it is true that parents often chose to continue supporting 
adult children for some years after they attain the age of eighteen, most parents are 
unwilling to do so indefinitely. As the award currently stands, Mr. Richardson has no 
ability to petition the court to stop the increased alimony payments, barring unforeseen 
circumstances. Otherwise, as long as Mrs. Richardson wishes to continue supporting adult 
children, Mr. Richardson is obligated to support them regardless of how old they are. In 
effect, Mrs. Richardson can hold him hostage to the decree, and she alone can decide when 
to terminate non-mandatory child support (inappropriately labeled "alimony" by the trial 
court). 
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II. Under Utah Law, Automatic Changes in Alimony, Such As the 
Automatic Increases Ordered in This Case, Are Disfavored Unless 
Supported By Evidence 
Under Utah law, alimony determinations must be based upon the payee spouse's 
needs either at the time of separation or at the time of trial. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(8)(c). See also See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 at 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Furthermore, "[t]he court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to 
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless 
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action." See Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-5(8)(g)(ii). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that future changes in alimony are best left to 
'^future determinations by the court under its continuing jurisdiction." See MacLean v. 
MacLean, 523 P.2d 862, at 863 (Utah 1974). Speculation about a party's future financial 
situation is not an appropriate basis for mandating automatic adjustments to an award of 
alimony. See Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 at 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
that automatic decreases in an alimony award, based upon trial court's vague and 
conclusory findings regarding wife's ability to earn future income, were improper). When 
no evidence is adduced in support of an order containing periodic changes to alimony 
payments, such periodic changes are an abuse of discretion. See Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 
189 at 191 (Utah 1975) (holding that periodic reductions in alimony and ultimate 
termination thereof was abuse of discretion because not based on the evidence at hearing, 
which only showed husband's income had gone down by an amount certain). 
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In the context of petitions to modify, the Utah Court of Appeals has unequivocally 
stated that "any future changes in alimony are limited to instances where a material 
change of circumstances has occurred." See Howell v Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (emphasis added). Indeed, even a party's impending retirement is an 
insufficient basis for a petition to modify. See Nelson v Nelson, 97 P.3d 722, 723-24 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
In Nelson, the court explained that petitioner's motion to terminate alimony, based 
upon his scheduled, impending retirement and concomitant reduction in income, was not 
ripe for decision because petitioner had not yet actually retired. According to the Nelson 
decision, changes in alimony are not appropriate until an "* imminent clash of legal rights 
and obligations'" has ripened. See Nelson, 97 P.3d at 723-24. 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion and misinterpreted relevant law by 
requiring Mr. Richardson to pay larger alimony payments to Ms. Richardson as each of 
their four minor children reaches the age of eighteen. See R. at 228-229 (explaining that 
"reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily 
diminish to zero as they reach eighteen . . . ."). These prospective increases are based on 
speculation about Mrs. Richardson's potentially ongoing and, in all probability, non-
mandatory costs associated with children who may or may not need support after they turn 
eighteen. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33) (wherein Ms. Richardson testified that 
because the parties' had previously supported their two eldest children while they lived at 
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home and attended college, she expected that the same would apply to the four younger 
children). 
This case is analogous to Nelson, where the petitioner's retirement had not yet 
occurred, and thus his retirement could not affect his obligation to pay alimony. Similarly, 
in this case, three of children had not reached the age of eighteen, and their future ability 
to support themselves was unknown. It is also unknown whether or not Dana or the other 
three children are or will be attending college or remaining in Ms. Richardson's home. 
Moreover, the parties have no obligation to support able-bodied children over the 
age of eighteen in the absence of a contractual obligation. See Part I of this Appellant's 
Brief, supra. Even if it is determined, in the future, that the parties have a statutory 
obligation to support any of their adult children (for example, in the event of disability), it 
would be a child support obligation and not a question of alimony. 
Essentially, the trial court has engaged in speculation about what voluntary 
expenditures the parties would make on behalf of their adult children in the future. That 
is not the purpose of either alimony or child support. Alimony is meant to enable the 
payee spouse to maintain her standard of living if she so chooses, or in the alternative, to 
equalize the income of the parties. Alimony is not meant to compensate the payee spouse 
for speculative, future expenditures on adult children that are wholly discretionary. The 
payor spouse could just as easily, and most likely will, choose to make discretionary 
expenditures on his adult children. If so, the payor spouse will also experience a potential 
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reduction in his discretionary income and his ability to pay alimony. Both parties should 
be free to decide to what extent they wish to support able-bodied, adult children, free of 
court interference. 
Finally, to the extent that the alimony increases could be viewed as support for Ms. 
Richardson's standard of living, such increases are based upon speculation about the 
future. It is unknown whether or not Ms. Richardson's living expenses will remain 
constant. She might, for example, move into a less expensive residence as the children 
move out. It is also unknown whether or not her earning capacity will increase. 
Similarly, it is unknown if Mr. Richardson's earning capacity will remain constant. 
His income could abruptly go down at or about the times of the court-ordered increases. 
Further, his expenses could increase for a variety of reasons. For example, one of the 
younger children could decide to live with him rather than with Ms. Richardson. The trial 
court abused its discretion by making assumptions about the parties' future expenses and 
their ability to meet such expenses. 
III. The Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Retroactive Alimony 
Because Mrs. Richardson Had Never Requested Interim or 
Retroactive Alimony Until the Conclusion of Trial 
Utah law provides, by statute, that in any action to establish an order of custody, 
parent-time, child support, or alimony: 
(3). . . the court may order a party to provide money, during 
the pendency of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the 
custody of the other party. 
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(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final 
order or judgment may be amended during the course of the 
action or in the final order or judgment. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3. 
An award of interim alimony is improper unless a party has requested interim 
alimony during the proceedings. Such retroactive awards are: 
contrary to the intent of the statute, which allows a party to 
move for interim alimony to meet the party's needs between 
separation and divorce. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3- 3(3) 
(1998) (stating "the court may order a party to provide money, 
during the pendency of the action") (emphasis added). It was 
not intended to be awarded as an afterthought in the final 
decree—especially when not requested by the benefitting 
party. See id. § 30-3-3(4) (allowing amendment to interim 
alimony entered "prior to entry of the final order") (emphasis 
added). 
See Osen v. Osen, (Unreported Memorandum Decision), April 6, 2000, WL 33249404 
(Utah Ct. App.). l 
Because Ms. Richardson never requested interim or retroactive alimony in her 
Petition or before trial, she waived her claim for such relief. The trial court therefore 
abused its discretion by awarding it. 
1
 Although not officially published, memorandum decisions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals may be presented as persuasive authority to Utah's appellate courts, provided 
that the parties and the court are supplied with accurate copies at the time the decision is 
first cited. See Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734 at 738 (Utah 2002). A copy of the 
Osen decision is provided in an appendix to this Appellant's Brief. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Kenneth Richardson requests a reversal of 
the Decree, insofar as it mandates increases in alimony as each of the minor children 
reaches the age of eighteen. Appellant also requests that the award of interim alimony be 
reversed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ± day of September, 2006. 
SCALLEY READ 
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NG BATES 
P.C. 
J. Bruce Reading 
William G. Wilson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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034905249 RICHARDSON,KENNETH ANDREW 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs ] 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, ] 
Respondent ] 
) Case No 034905249 DA 
) Judge Stephen L Roth 
) Commissioner Susan Bradford 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L Roth of the above-
entitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was 
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka Respondent appeared in person and was 
represented by his counsel, J Bruce Reading The Court, having heard argument of counsel and 
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the 
matter under advisement, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Petitioner is awarded a divorce from Respondent based on the existence of 
irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from continuing 
2. CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this 
marriage, of whom four are still minors. Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen 
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin 
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993 Petitioner is awarded sole physical and legal custody 
of the minor children 
3. Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the sum of $1,374 per month 
commencing as of the date of trial herein 
4. Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child 
until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever 
later occurs. 
5. Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support 
from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized 
6. INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: Petitioner shall be awarded the minor children 
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Dana and Justin as dependants for tax exemption purposes and Respondent shall be awarded the 
minor children Kyle and Avery. When Dana reaches eighteen (18), the exemptions should 
alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with Respondent having the deductions for 
two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which there are only three deductions 
available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second year, and so on. When the 
deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one deduction; when there is only 
one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner. In the alternative, for any tax year the party 
for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to purchase the option(s) from the other 
party for the amount the other party would lost if the exemption were not available. The parties 
shall exchange tax information by March 1st of each year. In any event, Respondent's ability to 
claim any minor child(ren) is conditioned upon his being current in his child support and medical 
expense obligations. 
7. MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical 
insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or 
her employment. If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said 
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah. 
a. Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium 
actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the 
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children 
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the 
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case. 
b. Each parent shall pay one-half QA) of all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent 
children. 
c. The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, 
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other 
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or 
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change. 
d. The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification 
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of 
payment. 
e. In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above. 
8. PERSONAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired certain 
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items of personal property including a savings account containing about $1,000 00, a certificate of 
deposit in the amount of approximately $6,000 00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent, 
tools, certain items of apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles a van in 
Petitioner's possession and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in 
Respondent's possession Petitioner shall be awarded the savings account, the certificate of 
deposit and the van and Respondent shall be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm 
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items 
9. There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a 
$50,000 00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300 00 It is in minor children's interest to 
keep the insurance policy in place, with Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor 
children irrevocably designated as the beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor 
children Once the last child is emancipated, the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive 
within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half QA) of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time 
of trial The parties have the option, if they both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, 
with the amount received in payment to be divided equally between them 
10 Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary Any loans taken out by Respondent 
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division 
5 
Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and 
loan balance of the 401(k) 
11 REAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired two (2) parcels of 
real property the marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, 92 
acre lot located in a subdivision in Willow, Alaska Neither property is encumbered by a 
mortgage or other significant lien Respondent shall be awarded the Willow lot, but shall pay to 
Petitioner the sum of $2,500 00 as her share of the Willow lot's value 
12 The Eagle River residence shall be sold and the proceeds shall be split equally 
between the parties However, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000 00 
to Petitioner 
13 ALIMONY: Petitioner is awarded the sum of $420 00 per month in alimony 
from Respondent The alimony payment due to Petitioner shall increase by $100 00 per month, 
beginning the first day of the month after which each child turns eighteen (18) On this basis, 
when the last child turns eighteen (18), the alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to an 
additional $400 00 per month 
14 Alimony shall continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage Changes 
in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be 
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate Alimony shall also 
6 
be paid retroactive to and including May, 2004 Said alimony obligation shall be automatically 
withheld by the Office of Recovery Services. 
15 PARENT-TIME: Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is 
functionally equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on 
court referral. Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of 
Alaska, such as the Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection Once Respondent has 
done this, parent-time shall begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code. Respondent must 
complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for parent-time If 
Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the class, and upon 
reasonable notice, he shall be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-3-35 of the Utah 
Code, or as the parties may agree. Respondent shall also be given liberal telephone access to the 
children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail communication if available The 
parties shall contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr-556-6037) to determine the nature of 
its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that program or one in Alaska that is roughly 
equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class approved by the Alaska counterpart to 
Division of Child and Family Services). No later than thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005, 
Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel with a description of the class he intends 
to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed class meets the requirements of the 
court, Respondent shall complete the class as soon as reasonably possible. If the parties are in 
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disagreement, they shall approach the court for a resolution, but prepare to offer specific 
alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written verification that he has successfully 
completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as set forth above can begin, including 
travel to Alaska All applicable provisions of the advisory guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the 
Utah Code shall be adopted herein 
16 Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year, 
provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30) 
days in advance If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only one-
half (14) of the transportation costs for that visit. 
17 ATTORNEY'S FEES: Respondent shall be responsible to pay Petitioner's 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter in the sum of $4,488 00. 
18. NAME CHANGE: Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired 
DATED this /feSiay of / \ A ^ . , 2006 
(Ci ./HONORABLE STEPHEN 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, ; 
Respondent. ] 
) Case No. 034905249 DA 
) Judge Stephen L. Roth 
) Commissioner Susan Bradford 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L. Roth of the above-
entitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was 
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka. Respondent appeared in person and was 
represented by his counsel, J. Bruce Reading. The Court, having heard argument of counsel and 
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the 
matter under advisement, and being otherwise frilly advised in the premises, hereby finds as 
follows 
1. JURISDICTION AND GROUNDS: As a threshold matter, the court notes that 
Petitioner has lived in Salt Lake County since January, 2003, after the separation of the parties in 
about mid-2002, and therefore concludes that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 
matter of this case Further, the parties have come to disagree deeply over crucial aspects of their 
life together, perhaps most importantly over the approach to raising and disciplining their children 
While Respondent states that he does not desire a divorce, the parties had the benefit of 
counseling before the filing of the Petition, have been separated for over two (2) years and have 
established separate lives The court concludes that there are grounds for entering a decree of 
divorce based on the existence of irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from 
continuing 
2. CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this 
marriage, of whom four are still minors Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen 
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin 
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993 The parties do not contest child custody and appear 
to be in agreement with Petitioner should have sole physical and legal custody Petitioner was the 
primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties' separation and the children continue to live 
with her at their present home in West Valley City, Utah, while Kenneth has remained in Alaska, 
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where the parties lived since their marriage in Anchorage on August 20, 1980 Petitioner appears 
to strongly desire custody, and she has been and continues to be a fit parent There is no 
indication that the children have any different custody preference The court concludes that 
Petitioner is and has been a fit and proper parent, that there is not reason to disturb the parties' 
own agreement with respect to custody. 
3 For purposes of the child support calculation, gross income includes income from 
almost any source, other than those specifically excluded by the statute See U C A, Section 78-
45-7 7(1) At the time of trial Respondent was working full time for Aurora Electric in 
Anchorage as a project manager/estimator, earning a salary of $1,188 47 per week according to a 
January 28, 2005, Employer Earnings Statement showing about $61,800 00 per year Apparently 
some time in 2003, after the parties' separation, Respondent was promoted to this supervisory 
position from the journeyman electrician position that he had formerly held at Aurora Electric 
He received a lower salary in the prior position, but normally and consistently worked substantial 
overtime (more than 40 hours per week) during the marriage and thus earned about $5,000 00 
(2001 W-2) to $6,000 00 (2002 W-2) more each year than he does now, because as a supervisor, 
overtime is no longer available to him Respondent testified that he took the promotion because it 
was a job change that he wanted and because his boss urged him to take the new position for the 
benefit of the company While there is no indication other than timing that Respondent took the 
promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for purposes of this proceeding, this was in 
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significant part a voluntary decision on his part that reduced his income For this reason, the 
court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping activities (in which he made up to 
$1,000 per year from time to time) as a source of income still open to him and to consider his 
historical overtime In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to impute $1,700 00 per year a 
reasonable assessment of Kenneth's additional earning capacity for purposes of child support and 
alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in his work position to 
accommodate reasonable work-related goals, while recognizing that those changes are largely 
voluntary, as well as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he has in the 
past, from scrapping or other work 
4 In addition, Respondent receives an annual distribution made to all citizens of the 
State of Alaska The most recent such distribution was $919, and Respondent testified that it was 
sometimes less and sometimes more The court finds that a reasonable estimate of Respondent's 
income from state distributions is between $500 and $2,000, with the average bearing significantly 
toward the higher figure, or about $1,500 This annual payment falls within the broad scope of 
gross income under the statute, and the court concludes that the $1,500 00 figure is a reasonable 
estimate of ongoing income from this source for purposes of calculating gross income (for child 
support and alimony) Respondent's gross income for child support purposes is therefore 
$61,800 00 plus $1,700 00 plus $1,500, a total of $65,000 per year, or $5,417 00 per month 
5 Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah, working full time Her last pay stub 
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for 2004 showed her annual salary to be $21,927 00 or $1,827 00 per month Petitioner's work 
experience is relatively minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding how their family would 
function during the marriage After about a year of employment, Petitioner cared for the children 
at home during the marriage, with only short periods of part time employment, and she does not 
appear to have developed any specialized job skills There was no evidence that she had either the 
opportunity or the capacity to earn more than what she is making now; and the court concludes 
that she is fully employed in her present position at the present rate of pay, which is her gross 
income 
6. There is no evidence that either party was obligated to any other person for 
alimony or child support outside the bounds of this case, and therefore gross income and adjusted 
gross income are the same for each party These figures are therefore to be used for calculating 
the share of child support attributable to each party, with Respondent to be the obligated party 
7. Based upon the foregoing, Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the 
sum of $1,374 per month commencing as of the date of trial herein 
8 Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child 
until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever 
later occurs. 
9 Pursuant to Utah Code §62 A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support 
from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized. 
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10 INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: The parties propose that they should each be 
allocated tax deductions for two children, but disagree on which No real basis for allocation was 
presented other than the representation that Petitioner needed at least one child deduction as 
follows Dana and Justin to Petitioner and Kyle and Avery to Respondent When Dana reaches 
eighteen (18), the exemptions should alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with 
Respondent having the deductions for two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which 
there are only three deductions available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second 
year, and so on When the deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one 
deduction, when there is only one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner In the 
alternative, for any tax year the party for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to 
purchase the option(s) from the other party for the amount the other party would lost if the 
exemption were not available 
11 MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical 
insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or 
her employment If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said 
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah 
a Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium 
actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance The children's portion of the 
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid The premium expense for the children 
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the 
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case 
b. Each parent shall pay one-half (Vi) of all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent 
children 
c. The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U S C Section 601 et seq , upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, 
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year The parent shall notify the other 
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or 
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change 
d. The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification 
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of 
payment 
e. In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above 
12 PERSONAL PROPERTY: The evidence at trial indicated disagreement over the 
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value and division of the certain personal property acquired during the marriage This involved 
essentially a savings account containing about $1,000 00, a certificate of deposit in the amount of 
approximately $6,000 00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent, tools, certain items of 
apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles a van in Petitioner's possession 
and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in Respondent's possession 
The parties agreed at the end of the trial that Petitioner receive the savings account, the certificate 
of deposit and the van and that Respondent be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm 
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items The court has no reason to believe that this 
division is not fair and equitable and therefore concludes that it is 
13 There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a 
$50,000 00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300 00 Respondent proposed that the 
policy be cashed out and the proceeds be share equally between the parties It was not clear to 
the court what Petitioner wanted in this regard It appears to the court that it would be of some 
value to the parties and in the children's interest to keep the insurance policy in place, with 
Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor children irrevocably designated as the 
beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor children Once the last child is emancipated, 
the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half QA) 
of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time of trial The parties have the option, if they 
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both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, with the amount received in payment to be 
divided equally between them 
14 Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary Any loans taken out by Respondent 
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division 
Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and 
loan balance of the 401(k) 
15 REAL PROPERTY: There are two (2) parcels of real property at issue, the 
marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, 92 acre lot located in 
a subdivision in Willow, Alaska Neither property is encumbered by a mortgage or other 
significant lien The parties agree that the equity of each property should be divided between 
them, but they disagree about the value of each property Petitioner believed the Willow lot to be 
worth about $10,000 00, based on unspecified calls to real estate agents in the area Respondent 
estimated the lot to be worth $3,000 00 to $4,000 00 and said that it had an assessment value on 
the tax notice of $4,200 00 The court believes that an estimated value of $5,000 00 is reasonable 
approximation of the value of the lot, given the sparse information presented Petitioner is to 
receive $2,500 00 as her share of the Willow lot's value 
16 The Eagle River home was purchased about twenty (20) years ago for about 
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$50,000 00 It was appraised in early 2004 at $60,000 00 Respondent says the appraisal is 
incorrect because it indicates that the house, a modular house, has sanitary sewer, asphalt street, 
curb and gutter, which it does not have He believes it is worth $47,000 00 based on a tax 
assessment and on his estimate that it will take about $13,000 00 to connect the house to 
municipal sewer, a step he says is necessary to make the house saleable Petitioner says she 
believes the appraisal is correct, even without a sewer hook-up, and that the house cannot have 
depreciated in value since it was purchased The appraisal indicates that property values in the 
area are increasing, and no evidence was presented on how property tax assessments were made 
Respondent has presented no reliable evidence of the effect on property value of the lack of sewer 
hook-up, much less that the value would be directly related to the cost of providing such an 
improvement Nor has he presented any evidence of how property tax assessments are made in 
the area or how reliable an indication of actual value they are or that property values have 
decreased since the purchase of the property for $50,000 00 over twenty (20) years ago The 
court believes that the appraisal is the most reliable indication of value under the circumstances 
and finds that the house is worth $60,000 00 at the time of trial and the equity should be divided 
equally, with the house to be sold and the net proceeds split equally between the parties In the 
alternative, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000.00 to Petitioner. 
17 ALIMONY: u[T]he purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from 
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becoming a public charge and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to 
the extent possible " Howell v. Howell, 806 P 2d 1209 (Ut Ct App 1991), citing Fletcher v 
Fletcher, 615 P 2nd 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980) The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P 2d 
1072 (Utah 1985), set out "three factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony 
award [1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife, [2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself, and [3] the ability of the husband to provide support " Id. At 1075 
(edits by the court, citations omitted), U C A , Sect 30-3-5(8) (which expands the number of 
factors to be considered, while retaining the Jones factors as an essence of the inquiry ) After the 
determination of the needs and resources of both parties using the Jones factors, "the court should 
set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to approximate the parties' standard of living 
during the marriage as closely as possible " Howell, 806 P 2d at 1212 In the case of a long-term 
marriage, the alimony award "should, 'to the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage '" Id, quoting Gardner v Gardner, 748 P 2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 
1988) cf Howell, 806 P 2nd at 1216 n 4 ("The alimony award, however, need not be large 
enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if 
that amount of alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse below that of the 
receiving spouse ") Having considered "all relevant facts and equitable principles," the court 
11 
"may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial" 
UC A, Section 30-3-5(8)(c) 
18 Petitioner's income, as discussed above, is $1,827 00 per month Accepting the 
annual deductions from her salary as set out in her 2004 year-end pay stub, they are Federal Tax 
($465 10), Social Security Tax ($1,286 53), Medicare Tax ($300 88), State Tax $551 73), and 
health, dental and vision insurance (together $1,176 52), for a total monthly deduction of about 
$315 00 Her net income for alimony purposes is therefore $1,512 00 (The court is not 
considering deductions for life insurance for either party because essentially voluntary (on the part 
of Petitioner) or building cash value from this point forward (on the part of Respondent)) Child 
support payments will be approximately $1,375 00 per month Total net income, without 
consideration of alimony tax consequences, is therefore about $2,897 00 
19 As to general expense deductions, the court believes that Petitioner's monthly 
expenses, as set forth in Exhibit 7, are reasonable, especially considering that she is caring for four 
(4) children Neither party presented much evidence of their standard of living at the time of 
separation, so the court is relying primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair 
substitute or approximation While she filed a financial declaration earlier that stated lower 
expenses, the court found credible her explanation that she had been keeping expenses 
deliberately low during that period because of the financial uncertainties of the unresolved divorce 
and had increased her expenses to a more normal level during 2004, the subject period for Exhibit 
12 
7 Those deductions are supported by detailed monthly expense reports Nevertheless, Exhibit 7 
contains more expenses that the court considers as either one-time costs or not allowable for 
purposes of alimony determination Those include attorneys fees and mediation costs related to 
the divorce in the amount of $1,331 00 They also include $1,779 00 in what appears to be a one-
time cost for the purchase of appliances ($906 10 to Maytag on January 26 and $873 05 to 
Maytag on February 7), although the court believes that one-half that amount (about ($890 00) is 
a reasonable annual budget for general maintenance of a home and its contents over a the long 
term, given the number of children in her care and the need to furnish a separate house, and ought 
to be included as an expense Because the testimony indicated that the parties historically have 
made donations to their church at about ten percent (10%) of income and continue to do so, each 
listing such donations as part of their expenses, the court considers these donations as a 
continuing part of their previous and present standard of living and will include them as 
reasonable expenses for both parties Deducting $185 00 per month for one-time expenses, 
Petitioner's reasonable expenses are $3,306 00 per month The deficit between her income, 
including initial child support, and her reasonable expenses is therefore about $409 00 per month 
20. Respondent's income, as discussed above, is $5,417.00 per month This amounts 
to salary of $61,800 00 per year, plus $1,500 00 state payment and $1,700 00 additional 
attributed income, per the analysis set forth above Deductions, per Respondent's weekly Direct 
Deposit Earnings Statement, including Medicaid $16 94), Social Security ($72 45), Federal Tax 
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$117.85), local tax $5.40) and health insurance $10.25). The court is not considering deductions 
for 401k contributions, a medical flex plan and a 401k loan repayment. The loan payment 
deduction (amounting to about $193.00 per month) is to pay off a $10,000.00 loan Respondent 
took out of his retirement plan in 2003, after the separation, to pay attorneys fees $5,000.00, a 
down payment on a new truck ($3,000.00), and a deposit in a savings account $2,000.00). The 
court does not believe the repayment on this loan, given its timing and the use of the proceeds, 
ought to be counted as a deduction from salary for alimony purposes. Other deductions appear 
reasonable. Similarly, the medical flex plan is a voluntary contribution (about $10.00 per week) 
that can be used to pay medical expenses as they arise (apparently deductibles and other expenses 
not covered by insurance). Because this is essentially a medical savings plan for the benefit of the 
Respondent, it should not be counted as a true deduction for alimony purposes. 
21. The total weekly deductions from salary are therefore about $223.00 or about 
$966.00 per month. Including an additional $26.00 per month to account for a proportional 
amount of deductions for the imputed $1,700.00 per year (there was no evidence that the state 
payment of $1,982.00 per year was taxed), the total deductions are about $992.00 per month, 
leaving a net income, before any alimony tax benefits of $4,465.00. There was no evidence of the 
effect of alimony payments on Respondent's tax liability or alimony receipt on Petitioner's, but 
the court does not believe that tax considerations related to alimony would substantially alter the 
conclusions reached herein. 
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22. Some expenses the court believes should not be included As discussed above, the 
court does not believe that the expenses for repayment of the 401k loan (about $193 00 per 
month) and life insurance (which the court estimates at $65 00 per moth based on the absence of 
any other evidence other than Respondent's claim to have $165 00 in monthly expenses for all 
insurance other than deducted health insurance premiums) should be included for purposes of 
alimony determination, as they are not necessities, and neither party urged their inclusion In 
addition, Respondent claims a total of $350 00 per month in medical and dental expenses There 
was no evidence of a need for health care that would support expenses at that level, especially 
since he apparently has employer-provided health insurance for which amounts are deducted from 
his salary, and absent any evidence of particular health conditions requiring treatment, the court 
believes that $50 00 per month is reasonable Respondent's reasonable expenses are therefore 
about $3,628 00 
23 Respondent therefore has a surplus of net income over expenses of about $837 00 
per month The court notes that, while both the parties and the court have used figures for 
income and expenses that appear quite specific, these figures in reality are approximations, 
especially as they are meant to ultimately represent amounts received and spent in the future In 
determining alimony, the court recognizes and takes into account the imprecision of the amounts 
involved 
24 Other than the equity in the marital home, the parties have accumulated little in the 
15 
way of resources to supplement their incomes Considering Petitioner's financial condition and 
needs and her inability to provide sufficient income to meet those needs, together with 
Respondent's ability to provide support and the significant income differential between them even 
taking into account the payment and receipt of child support, the court concludes that Respondent 
shall pay alimony to Petitioner In addition, the court believes it is significant that this is a long 
term marriage in which Petitioner gave up her ability to improve her skills and earning capacity to 
care for a large family, so that should play a part in the determination of alimony amounts, as well 
See Howell, 806 P 2d at 1213 The court believes that alimony in the amount of $420 00 is a fair 
and reasonable award This sum approximates the Petitioner's need, before consideration of the 
alimony tax consequences, and falls within Respondent's capacity to pay, as determined by the 
court. 
25 While a significant amount of her expenses can now be attributed to minor children 
in the home, a good part of the income needed by Petitioner to maintain the appropriate standard 
of living is also attributable to child support payments from Respondent As children reach the 
age of eighteen (18), which will be a regular occurrence over the next few years, the court 
believes that Petitioner's income will be reduced disproportionately to the reduction of expenses 
both because the reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not 
necessarily diminish to zero as they reach eighteen (18) years old and because expenses, such as 
mortgage, utilities and so on will not necessarily be significantly or proportionately reduce even 
16 
*"\ 
when children do leave the home For that reason, the court concludes that it is reasonable to 
increase alimony to some extent as Petitioner's income from child support payments goes down 
and as Respondent's expenses from such payments also diminish This also contributes to the 
goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of living after a long-term 
marriage Id (considering the effects of diminishing child support obligations as children reach 
eighteen (18) on the relative disparity of income between spouses) The alimony payments due to 
Petitioner should therefore increase by $100 00 per month, beginning the first day of the month 
after which each child turns eighteen (18) On this basis, when the last child turns eighteen (18), 
Respondent's income will have increase by about $1,375 00 per month, while commensurate 
alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to $400 00 per month, leaving him with some cushion 
that takes into account the purported increased costs of living in Alaska and not reducing his 
standard of living below Petitioner's 
26 Alimony should continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage Changes 
in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be 
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate Alimony should be 
paid retroactive to and including May, 2004 
27 PARENT-TIME: While it is apparent that Respondent loves his children, during 
the marriage he took a decidedly harsher approach to their discipline than did Petitioner, going to 
the extreme of punishing them by the use of a belt on occasion and threatening to do so more 
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regularly The court believes that this goes beyond acceptable limits on discipline of children and 
it apparently played a part in the break up of the marriage The children remain somewhat 
intimidated by their father, and their distance from him, both emotional and geographical at this 
point, has been exacerbated by his decision that it would be best under the circumstances of the 
separation to contact them infrequently While his telephone contacts have recently increased, he 
has seen the children only a few times since the separation Some or all of the children have been 
in counseling to deal in part with issues involving their father 
28 It is in the best interest of the children to reestablish their relationship with their 
father as soon as possible and that his access to them be as liberal as the distances involved allow, 
at a minimum in accordance with the applicable guidelines for parent time Under the 
circumstances, Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is functionally 
equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on court referral 
Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of Alaska, such as the 
Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection Once Respondent has done this, parent-
time should begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code The court's primary concern is that 
Respondent complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for 
parent-time If Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the 
class, and upon reasonable notice, he should be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-3-
35 of the Utah Code or as the parties may agree Respondent should also be given liberal 
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telephone access to the children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail 
communication if available The parties should contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr-
556-6037) to determine the nature of its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that 
program or one in Alaska that is roughly equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class 
approved by the Alaska counterpart to Division of Child and Family Services) No later than 
thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005, Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel 
with a description of the class he intends to take If the parties are in agreement that the proposed 
class meets the requirements of the court, Respondent should complete the class as soon as 
reasonably possible If the parties are in disagreement, they should approach the court for a 
resolution, but prepare to offer specific alternatives As soon as Respondent has provided written 
verification that he has successfully completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as 
set forth above can begin, including travel to Alaska All applicable provisions of the advisory 
guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the Utah Code shall be adopted herein 
29. Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year, 
provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30) 
days in advance If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only one-
half (V2) of the transportation costs for that visit. 
30. ATTORNEY'S FEES: Based on the Court's assessment that Petitioner's 
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expenses are beyond her income and other resources at this point and on its conclusions that 
Respondent's resources provide him with a surplus over his expenses (as discussed in connection 
with alimony, above), the court concludes that Respondent should be responsible to pay 
Petitioner's reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter Petitioner has insufficient income 
to meet her needs, and alimony payments will bring her income up to the point where her needs 
are met, not including attorney's fees Respondent will have a level of surplus and is more able to 
pay fees Petitioner should provide evidence of the amount and reasonableness of the fees she 
claims to the Court 
31 NAME CHANGE: Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired 
From the foregoing findings of facts, the Court now makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the bonds of matrimony hereto and now existing between Petitioner and 
Respondent shall be dissolved and Petitioner shall be granted decree of divorce from Respondent, 
the same to become absolute and final upon the signing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and the Decree of Divorce and the filing of the same with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court 
2. That all matters and issues including, but not limited to, child custody, parent-time, 
child support, alimony, division of property and debts, and attorney fees shall be ordered pursuant 
20 
to the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this j ^ d a y of 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ORME 
*1 The trial court in this case mixed property and 
support analysis to an unacceptable degree The trial 
court must first divide the property before it can 
meaningfully determine the propriety of an alimony 
award See Burt v Burt, 799 P 2d 1166, 1170 n 3 
(Utah Ct App 1990) ("Proper distribution of property 
interests of one sort or another should have come 
first, and only then would alimony need to be 
considered ") In dividing the marital property, the 
division should ordinarily be equal, but an unequal 
division can be justified by adequate findings See 
Hall v Hall 858 P 2d 1018 1022 (Utah 
Ct App 1993), Butt 799 P 2d at 1172 
In this case, the court divided the marital property in 
an unequal way, but instead of justifying that division 
on its own terms, it sought to close the gap in the 
value of the parties' property shares by giving 
appellant credits against alimony and by observing 
that he had benefitted from not having to pay 
temporary support an adjustment appellant 
characterizes as a retroactive award of temporary 
support — Such an approach is questionable anyway 
because alimony can later be modified or terminate 
by operation of law See Utah Code Ann § 30-3-
5(7)(g) & (8) (Supp 1999) Thus, the present value 
of credits against alimony is entirely speculative 
FN1 Insofar as the trial court intended an 
award of retroactive interim alimony, its 
award in this context was contrary to the 
intent of the statute, which allows a party to 
move for interim alimony to meet the party's 
needs between separation and divorce See 
Utah Code Ann § 30-3-3(3) (1998) (stating 
"the court may order a party to provide 
money, during the pendency of the action") 
(emphasis added) It was not intended to be 
awarded as an afterthought in the final 
decree-especially when not requested by the 
benefitting party See id § 30-3-3(4) 
(allowing amendment to intenm alimony 
entered "prior to entry of the final order") 
(emphasis added) 
However, the approach in this case was particularly 
inappropriate because the court found that appellee's 
reasonable expenses did not exceed her income 
Thus, she had not demonstrated a need for alimony, 
see Georgedes v Georgedes, 627 P 2d 44, 46 (Utah 
1981), and the court erred in awarding alimony to 
better equalize the parties' incomes when there was 
no demonstrated need for alimony — See Burt, 799 
P2dat 1170 &n 3 
FN2 In view of this conclusion, there is no 
need to decide the level at which the trial 
court should have set appellant's income in 
fixing alimony 
However, on the record before us, remand to give the 
trial court an opportunity to make findings which 
more adequately support the unequal property 
division is not necessary First, given certain findings 
explicitly made by the trial court and the objectives it 
quite obviously sought to accomplish, we are in a 
position to recognize findings impliedly made by the 
court See Miller v Maitmeau & Co, 1Q99 UT App 
216, % 46, 983 P 2d 1107, Hill v Hill 869 P 2d 963 
965 (Utah Ct App 1994) Second, it appears to us that 
the material evidence is not in dispute and the facts 
flow logically from it and need not really be "found " 
See City ofOrem v Henne, 868 P 2d 1384, 1388 n 7 
(Utah Ct App 1994) 
With these precepts m mind, we conclude the 
disparate property award in this case is fully justified 
by the following facts which are manifest in the 
record First, appellee has the custody of a minor 
child who needs housing, and it is in the child's best 
interest to remain in the home in which he has long 
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lived Second, the residential property awarded to 
appellee was on the appellee's family's estate and is 
surrounded by parcels gifted to appellee's various 
relatives, giving her a strong historical and present 
connection to it Indeed, the marital property was 
procured, in part, through a trade of a parcel earlier 
distributed to appellee, which was her separate 
property Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
only practical way to close the gap in value between 
the marital property distributed to each party would 
be to require appellee to sell or refinance the 
residence Either way, this would necessitate her 
incurring significant housing expense that she does 
not now have and, given her somewhat marginal 
financial condition as found by the court, would 
necessarily result in a shortfall between her income 
and her expenses and lead to a significant alimony 
award, with concomitant future entanglement of the 
parties, that can otherwise be avoided 
*2 Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing we 
affirm the trial court's division of the marital 
property We vacate the award of alimony We 
otherwise affirm — As both parties prevailed to a 
meaningful extent on appeal, each party will bear his 
or her attorney fees and costs on appeal See Hall, 
858 P 2d at 1027 
FN3 In so holding, we agree that appellant 
waived his right to have the items of 
personalty valued when he did not put on 
such evidence at trial and, when given the 
opportunity by the trial court to do so post-
trial, declined to avail himself of the 
opportunity 
BENCH, J , concur 
GREENWOOD, P J , concur m the result 
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